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19. Comparative approaches to constitutional history
Jamal Greene and Yvonne Tew*
A. INTRODUCTION
An historical approach to constitutional interpretation draws upon original intentions or
understandings of the meaning or application of a constitutional provision. Comparing
the ways in which courts in different jurisdictions use history is a complex exercise. In
recent years, academic and judicial discussion of “originalism” has obscured both the
global prevalence of resorting to historical materials as an interpretive resource and the
impressive diversity of approaches courts may take to deploying those materials.
This chapter seeks, in Section B, to develop a basic taxonomy of historical
approaches. Section C explores in greater depth the practices of eight jurisdictions with
constitutional courts or apex courts that engage in constitutional review: those of
the United States, Canada, Germany, Australia, India, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and
Singapore.
Because our selection of cases aims to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, we do
not attempt to draw firm conclusions about the global use of constitutional history.
Still, the qualitative evidence that follows hints at what might well be universal within
constitutional judging: (1) the significance of history broadly understood, and (2) the
limits on history’s reach into contemporary rights conflicts.
B. THE USES OF CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
The use of constitutional history as an interpretive resource has received enormous
attention from US scholars and relatively little attention from others (see Law 2015,
932). In the United States, discussion of the role originalist analysis should play in
constitutional law has slain many trees, but originalism is defined in too many ways to
retain significant descriptive power. What began as a primarily conservative movement
with the aim of providing purportedly neutral criteria to restrain judges adjudicating
controversial rights cases (see Scalia 1989) has since broadened considerably. Much
recent work understands originalism in terms that permit its compatibility with judicial
activism (see Barnett 2003), a progressive ideology (see Amar 2016), a robust doctrine
of stare decisis (see Baude 2015, 2358–61), and even living constitutionalism (see
Balkin 2011).
For that reason, we find it more fruitful to discuss the various ways in which courts
around the world use “historical” analysis, without burdening their practices with the
* We thank Anna Brennan, Suparna Reddy, and Samual Swoyer for valuable research
assistance.
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“originalism” label. The ways in which courts and individual judges may use
constitutional history, and their reasons for doing so, are heterogeneous. Below we
outline six variations that can help motivate a taxonomy of approaches to constitutional
history. We group these variations into three categories: (1) Type of History, (2) Pattern
of Usage, and (3) Type of Provision.
1. Type of History
i. Purposes or expectations?
A court may invoke history to identify the specific expectations that members of an
earlier generation had as to how constitutional provisions would apply, or it may do so
to identify the broader purposes or values that motivated the constitution. As in the
domain of statutory interpretation, contemporaneous history helps to reveal the
mischief the document meant to avoid or mitigate. We may contrast this approach with
one that ties current interpretation to the specific ways through which the founding
generation sought to vindicate the constitution’s ends (see Scheppele 2013, 27).
Examples of purposive interpretation abound, including from courts not traditionally
associated with historical argument. The German Constitutional Court has often
invoked Germany’s Nazi past as a “never again” aversive model that informs interpret-
ation of the Basic Law (Germany’s Constitution) (see Scheppele 2003). Justices of the
South African Constitutional Court have referred to the nation’s apartheid history in
elucidating the concept of ubuntu,1 which appears in the epilogue to the Interim
Constitution and is translated loosely as the value of mutual interdependence.2 In a
Japanese Supreme Court case holding that a Shinto groundbreaking ceremony did not
offend the separation of state and religion provided for in Article 20 of Japan’s
Constitution, dissenting judges made much of the history of state-sponsored religion
following the 1868 Meiji Restoration (Beer and Itoh 1996).
Each of these examples invokes history to identify a problem the relevant constitu-
tion or its particular provisions was meant to remedy. Identifying that problem does not
commit an interpreter to the view that current problems should be resolved just as the
drafters or the ratifiers would have contemplated.
ii. Intention or meaning?
An inquiry into how a constitutional provision was historically understood might focus
on the intentions of the provision’s drafters, perhaps on the theory that a text means
what its author intended it to mean (see Knapp and Michaels 1992, 187). Alternatively,
that inquiry might focus on the meaning a hypothetical reasonable person would have
given the text when it was adopted. Although intentionalist and original meaning-based
approaches to constitutional history are often grouped together (see Scalia 1997, 28),
they have radically different theoretical foundations and can produce different results.
For example, the US Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board of Education that the
equality guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited racial segregation in public
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, No. 200 of 1993, ch. 15, § 251(4).
2 See S. v. Makwanyane, 1995 (2) SALR 391, ¶¶ 222–27 (Langa, J.); ¶¶ 263 (Mahomed,
J.); ¶ 312 (Mokgoro, J.).
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schools.3 It is doubtful that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated
that it would invalidate segregated schooling (see Klarman 1995), but the original
meaning of “equal” arguably sanctions such progressive application (see Bickel 1955).
Jed Rubenfeld has described the key dichotomy in Brown as the difference between
“application understandings” and “no application understandings” (see Rubenfeld
2005, 46). On Rubenfeld’s view, a court should be bound by the applications to which
the ratifying generation affirmatively committed the nation, but not by what that
generation believed the commitment excluded (Rubenfeld 2005, 14). The South
African Constitutional Court appeared to adopt a version of this view in State v.
Makwanyane,4 its first significant decision. There, the Court acknowledged that the
Interim Constitution’s negotiators had deliberately declined to prohibit capital punish-
ment but nevertheless held that the death penalty was incompatible with the right to
life guaranteed in Section 9.5
iii. Texts or backdrops?
At times it may be as important to know what institutions a constitution retained as to
know what it created or changed. Stephen Sachs has coined the term “constitutional
backdrops” to describe “rules of law that aren’t derivable from the Constitution’s text,
but instead are left unaltered by the text, and in fact are protected by the text from
various kinds of legal change” (Sachs 2012, 1816). Sachs derives his examples from
US constitutional tradition: Thus, the Supreme Court has drawn on Founding-era
history to establish a constitutionally protected immunity from damages suits for states
even in the absence of explicit constitutional language so providing.6
The concept of backdrops is relevant to historical inquiry in other jurisdictions as
well. One recurring question is the scope and reviewability of prerogative powers
exercised by the executive. For example, in a case involving whether the German
president’s exercise of the pardon power based on mercy was subject to judicial review
under the Basic Law, judges of the Federal Constitutional Court drew on the history of
the power of mercy under the monarchy and through the period of the Weimar
Constitution.7
Historical inquiry is unavoidable in identifying a constitutional backdrop.8 Even a
court committed to evolving constitutional norms might have reason to invoke
pre-constitutional history or drafting debates to ascertain how the constitution affected
a traditional government power or custom.
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 1995 (2) SALR 391.
5 Id. ¶ 25. For contrasting reasoning, see the Singapore Court of Appeal decision in Yong
Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor [2010] 3 SING. L. REP. at [489], discussed in Section C.8, infra.
6 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
7 25 BVerfGE 352, ¶¶ 27–34 (1969).
8 See id. at ¶ 22.
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2. Pattern of Usage
i. Pluralist or dispositive?
Courts typically supplement discussion of historical meanings, purposes, or expect-
ations with other modes of analysis, whether grounded in textual exegesis, prudential
reasoning, established doctrinal frameworks, or prior precedent. We might distinguish a
court that views history as one resource among many from one that regards the
conclusions reached through historical analysis as dispositive or deserving of greater
interpretive weight.
For example, the US Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,
which held that a Washington, D.C. prohibition on handgun possession contravened
the Second Amendment,9 frontloaded its opinion with an extensive inquiry into the
historical meaning of the Amendment’s text. Only after its historical discussion did the
Court ask “whether any of [its] precedents forecloses” the conclusion it reached
through historical analysis.10 Placing history in this kind of privileged position, which
is unusual even in US cases, reflects a different approach than one that views it as on
par with or subordinate to other forms of analysis.11
ii. Interpretation or rhetoric?
Judges in constitutional rights cases invariably serve a political function. Their audience
is not merely the parties to the litigation—indeed, sometimes the parties are nonexistent
or out of the case—but also includes a broader public. The values the judges articulate
and the weights they assign to those values must resonate with the public if judge-made
constitutional law is to endure. A constitutional judge’s audience also and most
immediately includes her colleagues on the bench, whom she must persuade in order to
achieve a majority or to move the law in her preferred direction.
The burdens of persuasion may support a distinctly rhetorical invocation of history.
As Ozan Varol has documented, for example, the Turkish Constitutional Court has used
history to elucidate the views of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish
Republic, in cases implicating Turkey’s secular commitments (Varol 2011, 1239). Varol
attributes this practice to a “cult of personality” around Atatürk, whom “the Turkish
nation views … as a quasi-divine figure, a God-like war hero, and a foresightful
President who led a battered nation from despair to glory” (Varol 2011, 1283). The
imprimatur of such a figure is an important resource in constitutional argument quite
apart from one’s theory of interpretation (see Greene 2012).
Anonymous references to “the Convention” rather than to individual drafters tend to
suggest that historical understandings are performing an interpretive rather than a
rhetorical function.12 Such references rely implicitly on a theory of constituent
authority rather than on the celebrity of any historical actor. Likewise, one reliable sign
9 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
10 Id. at 619.
11 An example would be the Indian Supreme Court, a multimodal court that makes common
reference to the debates in the Constituent Assembly and particularly the words of B.R.
Ambedkar. Section C.5, infra.
12 E.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 356 (1819).
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that the views of Founding-era figures are being invoked rhetorically is when the figure
had no role, or only a symbolic one, in drafting the constitution. Consider the US case
of Wallace v. Jaffree, in which Justice Rehnquist dissented from the invalidation of an
Alabama law providing for a moment of silence in public schools, noting that President
George Washington had proclaimed a public day of prayer.13 He wrote archly: “History
must judge whether it was the Father of his Country in 1789, or a majority of the Court
today, which has strayed from the meaning of the Establishment Clause.”14 Rehnquist’s
message is clear, even though President Washington was not a significant constitutional
drafter.
The rhetorical purchase of the constitution’s drafting can cut both ways. Reference to
the framers could carry negative weight if the constitution is not a source of national
pride. As H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo has emphasized, several post-colonial African leaders
rejected Westminster- or French-influenced constitutions on the ostensible ground that
those instruments established non-autochthonous institutions that failed to fit local
political and social conditions (see Okoth-Ogendo 1993, 65, 68, 72).
3. Type of Provision
Not all constitutional provisions lend themselves equally to historical analysis (see
Greene 2016). The architecture of the government, procedural technicalities, and
historical compromises such as treaties are often intended by their drafters as complete
statements of future application. By contrast, provisions announcing individual rights
tend to be stated as principles or standards, which in their nature call for progressive
development (Balkin 2011, 6–7).
We do well to pay some attention to this distinction. As we discuss below, the US
Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren is often described as distinctly
ahistorical in its constitutional approach, but that Court applied historical methods in
cases relating to the constitutionally mandated structure of the political process.15
Likewise, as we show below, the Supreme Court of Canada, a self-avowedly non-
originalist court, has relied on the intentions of the drafters in cases involving specific
compromises embedded within the Constitution.16
C. CASE STUDIES
Below, we discuss the use of history in eight jurisdictions. We note at the outset that
seven of the eight are common law countries, with Germany the lone holdout. Part of
the reason for this selection bias is that common law courts often publish decisions in
English, which facilitates analysis for English-speaking scholars such as ourselves.
Further, civil law courts tend toward a deductive, mechanical style of opinion writing
that can frustrate identification of interpretive methods.
13 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
14 Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
15 Section C.1, infra.
16 Section C.2, infra.
Comparative approaches to constitutional history 383
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Delaney-Comparative_judicial_review / Division: 19_Chapter19_ts /Pg. Position: 5 / Date: 11/7
Erin F. Delaney and Rosalind Dixon - 9781788110594
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 11/26/2018 01:18:49PM
via Georgetown University
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3292350 
JOBNAME: Delaney PAGE: 6 SESS: 4 OUTPUT: Thu Aug 23 10:51:28 2018
1. United States
There is long-standing normative debate over the place of historical argument in US
constitutional interpretation. In recent years, an analogous debate has arisen over the
place of historical argument as a matter of positive constitutional practice. Justice
Scalia frequently claimed that US courts were originalist for most of their history, but
that the Supreme Court departed from that convention mid-century during the tenure of
Chief Justice Warren (Scalia 1989, 852–4). William Baude has suggested that,
understood in relatively broad terms, originalism fairly describes even current US
practice (see Baude 2015; see also Sachs 2015). Others have argued that history plays
little role in cases of any constitutional moment (see Strauss 2010).
In this section, we attempt to cut through this debate with the aid of the distinctions
Section B articulates. We make three descriptive points. First, historical argument is an
important mode of constitutional argument in the United States and can be an
especially powerful mode of argument in dissent. Second, the Supreme Court fre-
quently invokes the original understanding of constitutional provisions in cases
involving specific provisions. Third, historical argument has not been an important
mode of affirmative argument by Supreme Court majorities in modern individual rights
cases.
One of the ways Americans, including American judges, argue about the meaning
and requirements of the Constitution is by invoking history. Philip Bobbitt includes
historical argument in his well-known taxonomy of “modalities” of constitutional
argument in the United States, though he insists that it enjoys no lexical priority over
other argument forms (see Bobbitt 1988). Historical argument has pointedly been used
by dissenters to attack disfavored constitutional decisions—and over the last seven
decades, three Supreme Court Justices—Hugo Black, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence
Thomas—have placed the significance of constitutional history at the center of their
judicial philosophies.
One can identify Supreme Court decisions that rely heavily on historical argument
throughout the Court’s history. For example, in the 1831 case of Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, Chief Justice John Marshall dwelled on the original expectations of the
Constitution’s drafters in holding that an Indian tribe is not a “foreign state” eligible to
sue in federal court.17 Marshall relied on specific intentions despite a long post-
ratification history of treating the Cherokee as a foreign nation18 and even though he
seemed to believe that the equities of the suit weighed heavily in the Cherokee Nation’s
favor.19
The Court took the ostensible constraints of history no less seriously a generation
later in the notorious case Dred Scott v. Sandford.20 Scott, a slave suing for his
freedom, went to federal court on the theory that the Constitution confers federal
jurisdiction over suits “between citizens of different states.”21 The Court held that no
17 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1831).
18 See id. at 16.
19 See id. at 15.
20 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
21 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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descendant of African slaves could be a citizen of a state for federal constitutional
purposes. Chief Justice Roger Taney’s lead opinion is thoroughly originalist. It
canvasses state practices at the time of the Constitution’s enactment in an effort to
establish that the drafters had not intended to include African Americans within the
category of citizen and then argues that historical intentions fix the Constitution’s
meaning unless and until it is amended.22 Dred Scott is often criticized for the
inflexibility (and inaccuracy) of its historical argument (Greene 2011, 407), but Chief
Justice Taney’s methodology is not entirely out of place within the American
constitutional tradition.
For example, historical argument factored heavily even in decisions of the relatively
progressive Warren Court. That Court relied on documentary evidence of original
meaning in Powell v. McCormack—involving the power of the House of Representa-
tives to expel a member for corruption23—and in Wesberry v. Sanders—involving the
constitutionality of creating numerically unequal congressional districts.24 In Powell,
which Chief Justice Warren wrote, the Court dismissed reliance on post-ratification
congressional practices by stating that “[t]he relevancy of prior exclusion cases is
limited largely to the insight they afford in correctly ascertaining the draftsmen’s
intent.”25
The Warren Court’s occasional reliance on history tends to refute the notion that
historical argument has always had a conservative valence in US constitutional
adjudication. Indeed, it remains true today that the Court’s more liberal justices
regularly invoke history. In NLRB v. Noel Canning, concerning the scope of the
president’s power to use a Senate recess to make executive appointments, Justice
Stephen Breyer’s majority opinion first determined that the original meaning of the
appointments clause was ambiguous before feeling liberated to consider post-enactment
political precedent.26 In recent decisions concerning whether an independent commis-
sion could be empowered to create legislative districts and whether eligible voters was
the basis for population equality between legislative districts, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg wrote majority opinions that began with Founding-era expectations before
considering other arguments.27
The cases discussed above involve questions of constitutional structure. When we
turn to the Constitution’s individual rights provisions, we find a far more limited role
for history. The Supreme Court’s case law in the areas of antidiscrimination law, free
speech, taking of private property, and due process—notably including rights to
abortion and to same-sex marriage—does not typically engage with the original
understandings of the Constitution’s drafters (Greene 2016, 1639). With limited
exceptions, most notably in Heller28 and in certain areas of constitutional criminal
22 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 426.
23 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
24 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
25 Powell, 395 U.S. at 547.
26 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
27 Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015); Evenwel
v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).
28 Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
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procedure,29 the Court’s approach in individual rights cases has been purposive and
evolutionary.
2. Canada
The Supreme Court of Canada has openly disclaimed originalist methods. As Justice
Frank Iacobucci wrote in Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board): “This
Court has never adopted the practice more prevalent in the United States of basing
constitutional interpretation on the original intentions of the framers of the Constitu-
tion.”30 The Canadian Supreme Court has historically captured its progressive approach
to interpretation via the image of a “living tree.” The metaphor originated in a 1930
Privy Council opinion by Lord Sankey in which he declined to limit Canadian Senate
eligibility to men notwithstanding that women would not have been considered
“qualified persons” under the original expectations of the drafters of the relevant
section of the British North America Act.31 Since the adoption of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms in 1982, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that “[the] Constitution is
a living tree which, by way of progressive interpretation, accommodates and addresses
the realities of modern life.”32
The Court made its devotion to progressive interpretation transparent in an early case
on the constitutionality of a provincial law that made driving with a suspended license
a strict liability offense.33 The Supreme Court invalidated the law as a violation of
section 7 of the Charter, which prohibits deprivation of liberty “except in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice.”34 The Charter’s drafting history indicates
that this language was intended to confer procedural rights only.35 But Justice Antonio
Lamer, writing for the Court, emphasized that Charter interpretation was to be
“purposive,”36 and should not depend on “the comments of a few federal civil
servants.”37
Notwithstanding its commitment to living tree interpretation, the Court has, on
occasion, leaned heavily on the intentions of the Constitution’s framers. It has done so
most conspicuously in cases involving historical compromises that underwrite Cana-
dian federalism and its relationship to indigenous tribes. For example, in a 2003
decision, a Manitoba Métis challenged his conviction for hunting deer out of season on
unoccupied Crown land on the basis of a claimed immunity under the Manitoba
29 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000).
30 [1993] 3 S.C.R 327, 409 (Iacobucci, J., dissenting).
31 Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.).
32 Reference re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, ¶ 22.
33 Reference re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
34 Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 7.
35 Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Spec. J. Comm. of the S. and of the H.
of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, 1st Sess. of the 32d Parliament, 46:32 (1981)
(statement of Barry Strayer, Assistant Deputy Minister, Dep’t of Justice).
36 B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, 2 S.C.R. at 511.
37 Id. at 508.
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Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA).38 The case turned on whether a Métis
counted as an “Indian” within the terms of the NRTA’s hunting provisions. In deciding
unanimously against the defendant, the Court relied on historical evidence showing that
“the Métis were treated as a different group from ‘Indians’ for purposes of delineating
rights and protections” within the NRTA,39 and that the word “Indian” would not have
been thought to include Métis when the NRTA was enacted.40 The Court considered the
broader purpose behind the NRTA’s hunting provisions—they were based on “the view
that Indians required special protection and assistance”41—but it bound itself to the
historical application of this purpose rather than understanding it progressively:
“Rightly or wrongly,” the opinion states, “this view did not extend to the Métis.”42
The Court’s attention to history in Blais is not random or idiosyncratic. As the Court
later clarified, the intentions of the framers of the NRTA appeared to be determinative
because the interpretive question related “to a particular constitutional agreement, as
opposed to a head of power which must continually adapt to cover new realities.”43
There are other occasions on which the Canadian Court has lingered on historical
materials in cases involving specific agreements. In Reference re Manitoba Language
Rights, for example, the Court held that constitutional provisions enacted in 1867 and
1870 requiring that provincial laws “shall” be published in English and French were
mandatory even though Manitoba had been publishing laws only in English for nearly
a century.44 The Court analyzed uses of the words “shall” and “may” in the relevant
acts and the views of the “drafters” of the British North America Act on the meanings
of these words.45 The Court declared invalid nearly all of Manitoba’s laws but
suspended its judgment temporarily for so long as it took for the legislature to enact
new laws in both languages.46
Cases of this sort demonstrate that, as on other courts, part of the context relevant to
determining the use of historical materials is the nature of the constitutional norm
under review. Even so, outside of these discrete situations, the Canadian Supreme
Court’s rhetoric around what it identifies as originalism remains strongly oppositional
(Miller 2009, 331).
3. Germany
Constitutional interpretation on the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) is
often described as purposive or teleological. Donald Kommers has written that the
Court’s “focus … is often on the unity of the text as a whole from whence judges are
to ascertain the aims and objects—i.e., the telos—of the Constitution” (Kommers 1991,
38 R. v. Blais [2003] 2 S.C.R. 236. Provincial NRTAs are entrenched in the Canadian
Constitution. See Constitution Act, 1930 (U.K.), 20–21 Geo. V., c. 26.
39 Id. at ¶¶ 19–25.
40 See id. at ¶¶ 27–9.
41 Id. at ¶ 33.
42 Id.
43 Reference re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, ¶ 30.
44 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721.
45 See id. at ¶¶ 28, 32–3.
46 See id. at ¶¶ 107–11.
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844). The German approach is typically taken as emblematic of other European
constitutional courts where, Michel Rosenfeld has remarked, “recourse to originalism is
virtually nonexistent” (Rosenfeld 2004, 656).
There is no doubt that historical inquiry plays a relatively minor role in the opinions
of the FCC (Kommers 1991, 844–5). Still, we can identify at least three ways in which
history factors into the Court’s opinions. First, it can play an evidentiary function in
establishing the constitutional purposes that motivate the Court’s teleological approach.
Second, it may be used to understand the requirements of relatively specific structural
provisions of the Basic Law. Third, it has been used to identify constitutional
backdrops. We offer examples of each in turn.
The Court announced its teleological approach in the Southwest State Case, its
earliest significant opinion.47 In announcing its principles of judicial review, the Court
declared that “[e]very constitutional provision must always be interpreted so as to
render it compatible with the fundamental principles of the Constitution and the
intention of its authors.”48 What distinguishes this conspicuous reference to drafters’
intent from a narrow historical exegesis is the notion that particular clauses are always
subordinate to the Basic Law’s overarching principles.49 German purposivism is
tethered to the Constitution but the Court understands its subject at a high level of
generality.
On this view, history may be used to elucidate “the objective conditions out of which
a constitutional value or provision arose” (Kommers 1991, 845). Take, for example, the
Concordat Case, on the validity of a Lower Saxony law requiring nondenominational
schools, which was in conflict with a 1933 Reich treaty with the Holy See. The opinion
of the Second Senate contains much discussion of the events leading to the framing of
the Basic Law.50 Many actions of the Länder had ignored the educational requirements
of the concordat both before and after the demise of the Third Reich, and the Court
observed that the Länder wielded impressive political leverage in the ratification
process.51 This reality meant that the Basic Law had to “state expressly” any intention
to obligate the Länder to adhere to the concordat (Kommers and Miller 2012). In
articulating the context of German federalism, the Court noted that “the framers of the
Basic Law” had to take the political advantages of the Länder as “faits accomplis”
(Kommers and Miller 2012, 82). The Court recited constitutional history not to identify
historical analogs to the case before it but to make the case for a broad principle of the
Länder retaining legislative competence on all matters that the Basic Law does not
expressly confer on the federation.
In light of the tragic events that form the historical background to the Basic Law, it
is unsurprising that one of the principles whose purposes the German Constitution must
vindicate is that the paradigmatic sins of the Nazi regime must “never again” be
replicated (Scheppele 2013, 29). Thus, in the First German Abortion Decision, in which
the Court invalidated a federal abortion liberalization law as insufficiently protective of
47 1 BVerfGE 14 (1951).
48 Id.
49 See id. at 32.
50 The Federal Constitutional Court is divided into two “senates.”
51 Id.
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fetal life,52 the First Senate opinion interpreted the right to life in terms that invoked the
Holocaust as a negative model: “[T]he categorical inclusion of the inherently self-
evident right to life in the Basic Law may be explained principally as a reaction to the
‘destruction of life unworthy to live,’ the ‘final solution,’ and the ‘liquidations’ that the
National Socialist regime carried out as governmental measures.”53
Like the US and Canadian Supreme Courts, the FCC has also used historical
argument in cases involving constitutional provisions that represent specific structural
requirements or historical compromises. In the Parliament Dissolution Case,54 the
Court had to decide whether a Chancellor with majority support in the Bundestag
(Germany’s principal legislative chamber) could use the Article 68 power to call for a
vote of confidence as a strategic ploy to force new elections and obtain a stronger
majority (Kommers and Miller 2012, 154–5). In seeking an answer, the Court zeroed in
on “the genesis of Article 68.”55 Invoking specific meetings of the Parliamentary
Council that drafted the Basic Law, the Court noted that Council members were aware
of the dangers of early dissolution of parliaments,56 but their greater fear was the
governmental paralysis that would result from a weak Chancellor who could be
replaced by the Bundestag.57 The opinion is clause-specific and historically sensitive in
just the way one would expect from a court interpreting a constitutional provision that
helps to erect the nation’s political architecture.
The FCC has also used history to uncover what elements of Germany’s pre-
constitutional law the Basic Law preserves. The Constitution requires this inquiry:
Article 123 states that “[l]aw in force before the Bundestag first convenes shall remain
in force insofar as it does not conflict with [the] Basic Law.”58 In other words, the
Constitution recognizes constitutional backdrops. For example, in a case involving the
permissibility of secularizing a course offered by a theology professor, the Court noted
that the protected status of theology faculties under pre-constitutional Land constitu-
tions informed the meaning of constitutional silence on the matter: “The Parliamentary
Council simply said nothing on this topic, and it cannot be concluded from this that
there was a decision to the contrary, radically breaking with the existing German
university tradition.”59
Likewise, in a decision affirming the constitutionality of life sentences, the First
Senate took notice of the fact that when the framers of the Basic Law abolished capital
punishment, they assumed that life imprisonment was the available alternative.60 The
Court’s dive into constitutional history was deep enough that it felt the need to add the
disclaimer that history, though relevant, is not dispositive: “Neither original history nor
52 See Judgment of February 25, 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1 (translated in Robert E. Jonas and
John D. Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 JOHN MARSHALL
J. PRAC. & PROC. 605 (1976)).
53 Id. at 637.
54 114 BVerfGE 121 (2005).
55 Id. at ¶ 136.
56 Id. at ¶¶ 133–4.
57 Id. at ¶ 136.
58 Art. 123, The German Basic Law of 1949.
59 1 BVerfGE 462/06 (2008), ¶ 53.
60 See 45 BVerfGE 187 (1977); Kommers and Miller 2012, 364.
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the ideas and intentions of the framers are of decisive importance in interpreting
particular provisions of the Basic Law” (Kommers and Miller 2012, 365).
4. Australia
We are aware of no constitutional or apex court that more consistently understands its
role in terms of discerning the historical meaning of its constitution’s language than the
High Court of Australia. The canonical interpretive decision in Australia remains the
Engineers Case, in which Justice Isaac Isaacs wrote that the Court’s mandate was
“faithfully to expound and give effect to [the Constitution] according to its own terms,
finding the intention from the words of the compact, and upholding it throughout
precisely as framed.”61 As Chief Justice Samuel Griffith, an important framer of the
Australian Constitution, wrote in 1908, “whatever [a constitutional provision] meant in
1900 it must mean so long as the Constitution exists.”62
Australian scholars and judges refer to the Court’s methods as “legalism,” and its
methodological analog is British statutory interpretation (Goldsworthy 2006).63 Prior to
the High Court’s 1988 decision in Cole v. Whitfield,64 consultation of legislative debates
was generally forbidden as a distraction from the original meaning of the text.65 The
“intention” the Court consistently refers to is that of the Constitution as a document,
not the individual views of any particular drafters. Moreover, the Court has drawn a
distinction, drawing on John Stuart Mill, between the static “connotation” and the
“denotation” of the Constitution’s words. The former remains unchanged whereas
the latter may “extend” because of “changing events and attitudes.”66 For example, the
section 51 power to legislate for trade and commerce applies to airplane regulation
even though planes did not exist when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.67
Finally, unlike some American originalists, Australian jurists have not typically
described legalism as competing with stare decisis—a vibrant practice at the High
Court—perhaps because the theory did not arise as a backlash to what were perceived
as wrongly decided cases.
We discern at least two reasons for the persistence of legalism as a jurisprudential
commitment of Australian jurists. First, the Australian Constitution was drafted as an
English statute, and legalism reflects an internalization of British norms of statutory
interpretation.68 Second, Australia lacks a federal Bill of Rights, and judicial review of
individual rights is not a significant part of the Australian constitutional order.
Accordingly, the invitation to progressive constitutional application that individual
rights adjudication typically offers is largely absent from the High Court’s docket (see
Weis 2013, 844–5).
61 Amalgamated Soc’y of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129, 142.
62 R. v. Barger (1908) 6 C.L.R. 41, 68.
63 Amalgamated Soc’y of Engineers, 28 C.L.R. at 148.
64 (1988) 165 C.L.R. 360.
65 See AG Vict. ex rel. Black v. Commonwealth (1981) 146 C.L.R. 559, 578.
66 King v. Jones (1972) 128 C.L.R. 221, 229.
67 See Australian Nat’l Airways Pty Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1945) 71 C.L.R. 29.
68 See Tasmania v. Commonwealth (1904) 1 C.L.R. 329, 338.
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That being so, the past three decades have witnessed a highly public debate over the
progressive capacity of Australia’s constitutional culture. During the tenure of Chief
Justice Anthony Mason, which began in 1987, the High Court liberalized its constitu-
tional interpretive approach in several ways. First, as noted, it began to permit reference
to legislative history. Today it is not uncommon for Australian courts to cite to the
Australasian Convention Debates at Adelaide or to J.A. La Nauze’s canonical history of
the convention (Kirby 2000, 10). Second, the High Court began to accept the notion of
justiciable implied constitutional rights, most notably the right of political communi-
cation.69 Chief Justice Mason acknowledged that enforceable constitutional rights were
not part of the original constitutional design but claimed that Australia’s 1986
constitutional independence impliedly altered the relationship between Parliament and
its constituents.70
Most scholars would agree that the Mason Court did not kill off Australian legalism,
either because the Court backtracked under Chief Justice Murray Gleeson or because
the Mason Court’s departures were not so dramatic to begin with.71 In the wake of the
Mason Court, Justice Michael McHugh described the High Court as remaining invested
in original meaning but characterized its originalism as “faint-hearted,”72 willing to take
social context into account rather than viewing history as an “interpretive straitjacket”
(McHugh 2008, 22). Others, including frequent dissenters such as Justices Ian Callinan
and Dyson Heydon, have suggested that the Court’s approach is not much constrained
by history, at least in individual rights cases (see Weis 2013).
5. India
The Indian Constitution’s creation is indissolubly linked to a narrative of the nation’s
independence. “In the Indian constitutional imagination,” Sujit Choudhry observes, “the
Constitution marks a decisive and sharp break with the past and was a central element
in the formation of the Indian polity” (Choudhry 2013, 3). Historical appeals resonate
with India’s constitutional project; the Constitution’s starting point is usually invoked to
identify the purpose behind the broader plan established at the founding (Choudhry
2013, 3). References to the framers of the Indian Constitution—particularly, its chief
architect B. R. Ambedkar—are made to support arguments about these constitutional
purposes.
The Indian Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretation approach has been called
“eclectic” (Chandrachud 2016, 73), although this has not appeared to erode public
perception of the Court’s institutional legitimacy. While the Court has not adhered to a
consistent interpretive approach, constitutional history is present in Indian constitu-
tional practice. We offer three such examples.
69 See Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106
[hereinafter ACTV]; see also Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R.
104.
70 ACTV, 177 C.L.R. at 138.
71 For an example of the former view, see, e.g., Selway 2003. For the latter view, see e.g.,
McHugh 2008.
72 Eastman v. The Queen (2000) 203 C.L.R. 1, 33; cf. Scalia 1989, 864.
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Consider first the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in the NJAC Case.73 Since the
Court’s 1993 judicial appointments decision,74 judges are appointed to the Supreme
Court and High Courts through a “collegium” system of appointments, in which the
Chief Justice and other senior justices play a primary role. Parliament sought to replace
this system with an appointments process led by a National Judicial Appointments
Commission. Invoking the “basic structure” doctrine for only the fourth time in its
history,75 the Court struck down a constitutional amendment and a statute enacted to
change the judicial appointments process. By a four to one majority, the Court declared
the amendment unconstitutional for violating judicial independence, a part of the
Constitution’s basic structure.76
The focus on constitutional history in the NJAC Case is striking. The Attorney-
General relied “emphatically” on the Constituent Assembly debates to argue that the
Supreme Court’s earlier judicial appointments judgments had been “diagonally oppo-
site” to the “intent and resolve of the Constituent Assembly.”77
In response, the Court repeatedly referred to the drafting debates to support its
conclusion that judicial primacy in the appointment process is integral to judicial
independence. Justice Kehar frequently mentioned Ambedkar’s statements in arguing
that the drafters had intended judicial appointments to be “shielded” from “political
considerations.”78 Concluding that this was the framers’ “true intent” behind the clause
that the president appoint judges after “consultation” with the Chief Justice,79 Justice
Kehar declared that the word “consultation” could not “be assigned its ordinary
dictionary meaning.”80
Justice Lokur, too, paid close attention to history. Cautioning that “those who do not
remember their past are condemned to repeat their mistakes,”81 he employed historical
arguments to assert that the understanding at the time was that the president should
consult and defer to the chief justice.82 In addition to the Constituent Assembly
debates83 and Ambedkar’s views,84 Justice Lokur referred extensively to other sources
from the constitution-making period, such as memoranda submitted to the drafting
committee85 and Granville Austin’s scholarly work.86
73 Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015) 5 RAJ 350
[hereinafter NJAC Case].
74 Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441.
75 See L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261; Minerva Mills v. Union of
India (1980) 3 SCC 625; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) 1 Suppl. SCC 97.
76 NJAC Case, 5 RAJ at ¶¶ 254–6 (Kehar, J.).
77 NJAC Case, 5 RAJ at ¶¶ 17, 73, 124.
78 Id. at ¶ 79.
79 Id.; see INDIA CONST. art. 124.
80 NJAC Case, 5 RAJ at ¶ 77 (Kehar, J.).
81 Id. at ¶ 4 (Lokur, J.).
82 Id. at ¶ 54.
83 Id. at ¶¶ 34–53.
84 Id. at ¶¶ 18–24.
85 See id. at ¶¶ 31, 36, 38, 43, 45–50.
86 See id. at ¶ 32.
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Although the accuracy of the NJAC Case majority’s historical claims has been
contested,87 the interpretive moves made by the majority are originalist. They are
grounded in appeals to the framers’ intent and the aims behind the Constitution’s
creation.
A second example of constitutional history being used in practice is the Delhi High
Court decision in Naz Foundation v. Government of Delhi.88 In 2009, the court held a
penal code provision criminalizing same-sex activity unconstitutional for violating
equality and liberty guarantees.89 Appealing in soaring terms to the ideals behind the
drafting of these constitutional liberties, it declared that “[t]hese fundamental rights had
their roots deep in the struggle for independence.”90 Endorsing the idea of the Indian
Constitution as “first and foremost a social document,” the court viewed the Constitu-
tion’s aim as achieving a “social revolution by creating an egalitarian society.”91 Using
as a guide the constitutional morality “strongly insisted upon by Dr. Ambedkar in the
Constituent Assembly,”92 the Delhi High Court declared that it “would be against
constitutional morality to criminalize homosexuals only on account of their sexual
orientation.”93
The Naz Foundation decision has been hailed as an illustration of “a comparative,
engaged living originalism in practice” (Choudhry 2013, 18). What is clear is that the
use of history in Naz Foundation is not in service of a rigidly textualist or specific
application form of originalism. Rather, the court “reframed the concepts of originalism
and morality to demonstrate how both ideas demanded the overturning of such laws”
(Katyal 2010, 1465). In reaching its decision, the High Court “turned for help[] to an
older moment, a moment of origin” (Bhan 2009, 94). The invocation of historical
arguments go to the Constitution’s overarching goals and sounds in the “conscience of
the Constitution.”94
In 2013, the Supreme Court overturned the Delhi High Court judgment in a panel
decision which appears to pay little attention to constitutional history.95 Yet, the
Supreme Court’s skepticism about relying on foreign experiences—associating LGBT
rights claims with Western values96—speaks, in a sense, in the language of the Indian
Constitution as an anti-colonial project.
Contrast the High Court’s Naz Foundation judgment with the Supreme Court’s
narrowly originalist approach in A.K. Gopalan v. Madras.97 In this 1950 case involving
87 See, e.g., Sengupta 2011, 126; Chintan Chandrachud, Debating the NJAC Judgment of
the Supreme Court of India: Three Dimensions, UK CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION (2015),
www.ukconstitutionallaw.org/2015/11/03/chintan-chandrachud-debating-the-njac-judgment-of-the-
supreme-court-of-india-three-dimensions/.
88 (2009) 160 DLT 277 (Del) [hereinafter Naz Foundation (HC)].
89 Id.; see PEN. CODE, art. 14; PEN. CODE, art. 21.
90 Naz Foundation (HC), 160 DLT at ¶ 52.
91 Id. at ¶ 80.
92 Id. at ¶ 79.
93 Id. at ¶ 80.
94 Id. at ¶ 80.
95 Koushal v. Naz Foundation, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013.
96 Id. at ¶ 52.
97 (1950) 1 S.C.R. 88.
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a constitutional challenge to preventive detention laws, the Court refused to interpret
the Article 21 due process guarantee as containing any substantive protections.98
Notably, in choosing to reject substantive due process in Gopalan the Court explicitly
looked to the drafting history of Article 21.99 India’s constitutional framers had sought
to avoid the American constitutional experience with substantive due process by
amending the original wording of the Indian due process clause.100 Justice Felix
Frankfurter, no less, had warned the Indian constitutional drafters to avoid the risk of
Lochner-esque economic libertarianism (Neuborne 2003, 479 n.21). Reflecting on the
Court’s decision, one commentator noted that “[a]s a matter of strict originalism, the
Gopalan Court was probably justified in declining to read substantive protections in
article 21” (Neuborne 2003, 479 n.21).
Later, in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,101 the Court rejected the Gopalan
Court’s due process approach, recognizing an implied substantive due process right and
endorsing an expansive, purposive approach to interpreting fundamental rights that
paved the way for the Indian Supreme Court’s assertive role in rights protection.
Accordingly, the Gopalan Court’s narrow approach to due process and originalism has
receded in Indian constitutional jurisprudence even as the Supreme Court has cemented
its powerful institutional position in Indian constitutional governance.
Constitutional interpretation in India is pluralistic, not predominantly focused on
history. Nevertheless, when invoked, the power of historical arguments sounds in the
broader ideals of India’s constitutional project.
6. Hong Kong
Since coming into force on July 1, 1997, as part of Hong Kong’s “one country, two
systems” constitutional arrangement, Hong Kong’s Basic Law has been a fault line of
tension between the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal and the Standing Committee of
the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China. The contestation
over the Basic Law exemplifies the broader conflict between these two systems of
different ideological, cultural, and legal traditions in modern Hong Kong (Chan 2014,
170).
Drafted by committee members who were approved by the Standing Committee and
drawn mostly from mainland China, the Basic Law codified policies in accordance with
the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, which provided for Hong Kong to operate with
a high degree of autonomy upon its transfer to China. It came into effect in 1997
when Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region under Chinese sovereignty.
While Hong Kong courts are authorized to interpret provisions of the Basic Law, the
final power to interpret the Basic Law is vested in the Standing Committee.102
Despite the political climate in which it operates, the Court of Final Appeal has
“ascended” (Ip 2016, 565) into the role of “custodian of the constitution” (Chen and Lo
98 Id. at 107–10.
99 Id. at 110–11.
100 Id. at 111.
101 (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621.
102 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 158.
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2014, 390). The Court has generally favored a purposive approach toward interpreting
the Basic Law, focused on the text, and has been skeptical of narrowly conceived
historical claims tied to the original intent of the Basic Law drafters.103 According to
the Court, the Basic Law is “a living instrument intended to meet changing needs and
circumstances”104 and ascertaining its “true meaning” requires considering “the pur-
pose of the instrument and its relevant provisions as well as the language of its text in
the light of the context.”105 The Court’s approach is in line with traditions of common
law constitutionalism familiar to the Hong Kong legal system (Ip 2016, 593).
The Standing Committee, however, has not hesitated to refer to the original intent of
the Basic Law’s drafters in interpreting the constitutional document and has relied on
legislative materials related to the drafting of the Basic Law (see Young 2007, 16). In
its 1999 Basic Law Interpretation, the Standing Committee referred to the written
opinion of a preparatory committee in 1996 as evidence of the original intent,106 and
declared that “the interpretation of Court of Final Appeal [was] not consistent with the
legislative intent.”107
The Court of Final Appeal refused to adopt the original intent approach endorsed by
the Standing Committee. In 2001, the Court declared that the task of the courts “is not
to ascertain the intent of the lawmaker on its own.”108 “Once the courts conclude that
the meaning of the language of the text when construed in the light of its context and
purpose is clear,” wrote the Chief Justice, “the courts are bound to give effect to the
clear meaning of the language.”109 A court should not “on the basis of any extrinsic
materials depart from that clear meaning and give the language a meaning which the
language cannot bear.”110 After this case, as Eric Ip observes, “Hong Kong judges
seemed to have no obligation to follow the Standing Committee’s arbitrary claims of
‘original’ intent” (Ip 2016, 583).
In light of the composition of the committee that drafted the Basic Law, it is
unsurprising that the Hong Kong courts have strenuously sought to avoid interpretation
based on the framers’ intent. As Albert Chen has remarked: “If the original intent were
to be given effect to, does this mean that the Basic Law would have to be interpreted in
accordance with mainland Chinese thinking, assumptions, values and interest?” (Chen
2000, 421).
Writ large, though, the conflicts over Hong Kong’s Basic Law are not simply over
disparate interpretive methods but also between different institutional interpreters.
Which forms of historical argument have salience—and with whom—depends greatly
on Hong Kong’s political and historical context in which two systems co-exist within
one country.
103 See Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration (1999) 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 4.
104 Id. at ¶ 73.
105 Id. at ¶ 74.
106 The Interpretation by the Standing Comm. of the National People’s Congress of Articles
22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law (adopted on June 26, 1999).
107 Id.
108 Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen (2001) 4 H.K.C.F.A.R. 211, 223.
109 Id. at 225.
110 Id.
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7. Malaysia
Constitutional history is frequently invoked in debates over the place of religion in
Malaysia’s constitutional order. Contemporary politics and adjudication divide over
whether the Malaysian state is secular or Islamic. On August 31, 1957, the Malayan
Constitution came into force when the Federation of Malaya gained independence
from the British. Six years later, the 1957 Merdeka Constitution would become the
basis for the Federal Constitution of Malaysia when Singapore and the Borneo states
of Sabah and Sarawak joined the Malayan Federation to create the new nation of
Malaysia. Much of the debate has centered over the Article 3(1) declaration that
“Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practised in peace
and harmony …”111
Growing Islamization in Malaysia’s political discourse over the past three decades
has challenged the established understanding at the Constitution’s creation that Article
3(1) would not undermine the Constitution’s secular foundation (see generally Fer-
nando 2006).112 Historical arguments have featured prominently in the legal and
political battleground. Proponents of Malaysia’s Islamization have employed historicist
rhetoric to expand Islam’s constitutional scope (see Tew 2014, 801–18). Secularists, in
response, have sought to defend the Constitution’s secular basis by recourse to the
original understanding of Article 3(1).
Initially, constitutional arguments relied on the intent of the framers to establish
the Malaysian Constitution’s secular foundations. In a landmark 1988 decision, the
Supreme Court (later renamed the Federal Court) made clear its focus of inquiry: “The
question here is this: Was this the meaning intended by the framers of the Constitu-
tion?”113 It concluded that Malaysia’s constitutional and drafting history showed that
Islam’s role was confined only to “rituals and ceremonies.”114 Two years later, the
Supreme Court again affirmed the Constitution’s secular basis after seeking to
“ascertain … what purpose the founding fathers of our Constitution had in mind when
our constitutional laws were drafted. …”115
Those wishing to prioritize Islam’s constitutional position, however, have mobilized
historical arguments to promote Islam’s supremacy. In Meor Atiqulrahman,116 for
example, the High Court constructed a historical account of the constitutional bargain
to argue that the framers had intended to secure Islam’s dominant position as a result of
the social contract struck at the founding.117 And in Lina Joy, the High Court insisted
that allowing Muslims to convert out of Islam “would result in absurdities not intended
111 FED. CONST. (MALAY.), art. 3(1).
112 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION at
¶ 11.
113 Che Omar bin Che Soh v. Public Prosecutor (1988) 2 MALAYAN L.J. 55, 56.
114 Id. at 56–7.
115 Teoh Eng Huat v. Kadhi Pasir Mas (1990) 2 MALAYAN L.J. 300, 301.
116 Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak v. Fatimah bte Sihi (2000) 5 MALAYAN L.J. 375 (High
Court, Seremban).
117 Id. at 385; see also id. at 384.
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by the framers …”118 Although these historical accounts have been criticized as
“revisionist” (see Thio and Neo 2006, 681–3), what is notable is these courts’ insistence
on using historical arguments to support an expansive interpretation of Article 3(1)
despite established Supreme Court precedent confining its scope.
Judges alarmed by this expansion of Islam’s position have fought back on originalist
turf. In his Lina Joy dissenting opinion, Justice Malanjum asserted that the courts had
a duty to uphold an individual’s religious freedom.119 Significantly, the Justice viewed
his interpretation as faithful to the framers’ intent: “Sworn to uphold the Federal
Constitution, it is my task to ensure that it is upheld at all times by giving effect to
what I think the founding fathers of this great nation had in mind when they framed
this sacred document.”120
Recourse to constitutional history has also been used to advocate a purposive
interpretation of the Constitution’s fundamental liberties.121 Its proponents exhort “a
liberal approach in order to implement the true intention of the framers” of the
Constitution.122 They seek to empower the courts to protect constitutional rights from
legislative infringement by expanding the scope of enforceable rights and support
drawing implied rights from the Constitution’s text and founding principles.123
Strikingly, historical argument in Malaysia is usually employed by political liberals
in support of a rights-expansive constitutional adjudication approach not associated
with judicial constraint. Secularists routinely reach back to the Constitution’s founding
premises to argue for more robust protection of individual constitutional rights.
Originalist discourse in Malaysia is characterized by a focus on the intent of the
framers and constitutional history, rather than textual meaning. Historical evidence is
viewed favorably as an extrinsic interpretive aid to determine the actual intentions of
individual framers.124
Constitutional history in Malaysia has not been confined to the courts, but has a
distinctly popular dimension (see Tew 2014, 813–14). Secularists and Islamists battle
so deeply over the history surrounding Malaysia’s constitutional founding because it is,
in essence, a struggle over the nation’s identity. Constitutional history provides a means
by which to articulate narratives about the country’s founding (see Evans 2009, 438).
Historical argument in judicial and popular discourse has potency because of its role in
linking constitutional narrative with national identity.
118 Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor (2004) 2 MALAYAN L.J. 119, [18]. See
FED. CONST. (MALAY.), art. 11(1) (“Every person has the right to profess and practice his
religion …”).
119 Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (2007) 3 ALL MALAY. REP. 585,
623[53]–24[53].
120 Id. at 619[23].
121 See, e.g., Sivarasa Rasiah v. Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor (2010) 2 MALAYAN L.J.
333, ¶¶ [22]–[23].
122 Tan Tek Seng v. Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan (1996) 1 MALAYAN L.J. 261, 288;
see also Lee Kwan Woh v. Pub. Prosecutor (2009) 5 MALAYAN L.J. 301, 312.
123 See, e.g., Sivarasa Rasiah (2010) 2 MALAYAN L.J. 333; Muhammad Hilman bin Idham v.
Kerajaan Malaysia (2011) 6 MALAYAN L.J. 507.
124 See, e.g., Zambry bin Abd Kadir v. Mohammad Nizar bin Jamaluddin (2009) 5 MALAYAN
L.J. 464, 534 (CA).
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8. Singapore
Unlike Malaysia’s Constitution, conceived on the heady road to independence, Singa-
pore’s constitutional origins emerged from more pragmatic circumstances. Singapore
achieved independence from Britain when it joined the Federation of Malaysia in 1963.
The union was unhappy and brief. In August 1965, Singapore separated from the
Federation to become a sovereign state, and the Singapore government cobbled
together a working constitution from several documents.125 Although much of the
Singapore Constitution is based on Malaysia’s Constitution, it is distinct in several
ways; for example, Malaysia’s Islamic constitutional clause has no Singaporean
counterpart.
The prevailing approach to constitutional interpretation by the Singapore courts has
been characterized by strict legalism and a highly deferential stance toward the political
branches of government (see Neo 2016, 3–6). In light of Singapore’s lack of a
momentous constitutional founding moment, it is unsurprising that judicial appeals to
history have not featured prominently in its constitutional jurisprudence. That is, until
the Singapore apex court’s heavily originalist decision in Yong Vui Kong v. Public
Prosecutor,126 which involved a constitutional challenge to the mandatory death penalty
brought by an appellant convicted of drug trafficking.
The Singapore Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the argument that the manda-
tory death penalty constituted an inhuman punishment that violated the right to life
guaranteed by Article 9(1) of Singapore’s Constitution.127 The Court’s opinion is
self-consciously originalist, focusing on the text and framers’ intent. It refused to find
an implied prohibition against inhuman punishment, reasoning that the framers had
deliberately omitted to include such a prohibition.128 The Court took the lack of any
explicit prohibition against inhuman punishment in Singapore’s Constitution as evi-
dence of the framers’ original understanding.129
The Court’s focus on the framers’ original intent is striking, particularly since
Singapore’s Constitution is based on the 1957 Independence Malayan Constitution,
which was drafted by a constitutional commission chaired by Britain’s Lord Reid.130
Despite the oddity of relying on the original intent of another nation’s constitutional
drafters (see Yap 2016, 120), Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong emphasized that the Reid
Commission had not recommended a prohibition against inhuman treatment, even
though such a provision existed in the European Convention on Human Rights at the
time.131 Such an “omission … was clearly not due to ignorance or oversight” on the
125 Singapore’s 1965 Constitution was a composite of its amended State Constitution, the
Republic of Singapore Independence Act, and the applicable provisions of Malaysia’s Federal
Constitution.
126 (2010) SGCA 20.
127 CONST. OF THE REP. OF SING. art. 9(1) (“No person shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty save in accordance with law”).
128 Yong Vui Kong, SGCA 20 at [60]–[75].
129 Id. at [61].
130 Id. at [62].
131 Id.
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drafters’ part.132 Therefore, to find such an implied prohibition would be “to legislate
new rights into the Singapore Constitution under the guise of interpreting existing
constitutional provisions.”133 The Court also noted that Singapore’s Constitutional
Commission had convened in 1966 and had proposed adding an inhuman treatment
prohibition, but that the “proposal was ultimately rejected by the Government.”134 As
such, it was “not legitimate for [the] court to read into Art 9(1) a constitutional right
which was decisively rejected by the Government in 1969. …”135
The Singapore Court maintained its focus on constitutional history in two subsequent
cases involving the same appellant. In 2011, the Court drew on the “legislative history
of the clemency power in this jurisdiction” to conclude that the Constitution “excludes
any role for the President’s personal discretion” in the exercise of clemency.136 The
Court also rejected another appeal on the grounds that there was “no evidence in the
historical record” to indicate that the original understanding of the right to life
prohibited corporal punishment.137
The originalist approach employed by the Singapore Court of Appeal bears little
resemblance to the appeals to history displayed across the border in Malaysia.
Constitutional interpretation in Singapore is heavily formalist, and its originalist
jurisprudence is no exception. The Yong Court’s narrowly textualist approach to
original understanding is in service of judicial deference.138
Judicial invocation of constitutional history reflects the Singapore Court’s deferential
approach to the political branches. The Court employs originalist arguments pruden-
tially: It is concerned with constraining judicial discretion and ensuring deference
toward legislative majorities. The manner in which historical arguments are employed
in Singapore is unsurprising in light of its constitutional culture, which reflects “a
predominant constitutional pragmatism” (Thio 2012). The Singapore Court’s reliance
on history is in service of judicial deference, focused on text, and has little popular
appeal outside the courts.
D. CONCLUSION
The uses and practices of constitutional history vary across different comparative
contexts. We have offered a number of distinctions that an observer may draw in
describing a particular court’s use of constitutional history. We have also described the
practices prevalent within eight jurisdictions that have a constitutional court or an apex
court that engages in constitutional review. Our selection of jurisdictions, while
interstitial, shows that the salience of constitutional history is contingent on a nation’s
political and historical traditions and is often also connected to temporal socio-cultural
132 Id.
133 Id. at [59].
134 Id. at [64].
135 Id. at [72].
136 Yong Vui Kong v. Attorney-General (2010) 2 SLR 1189, [174].
137 Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor (2010) SGCA 11, [23].
138 Yong Vui Kong, SGCA 20 at [49], [52].
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elements. For instance, historical arguments appear to thrive in constitutional cultures
where there is popular identification with the narratives associated with the constitu-
tion’s founding, like the United States and Malaysia.
Other factors that influence the use of history might be easier to predict. For
example, we suspect that frequent amendment might tend to dull references to the
original constitutional design (though it might also spur dialogue about the constitu-
tion’s core commitments, as in the case of India’s basic structure doctrine). Frequent
amendment might diminish the rhetorical purchase of the initial framers. Similarly,
repeated experience with the contentious process of constitutional drafting may make
drafter worship less likely and might educate the public about the compromises that
inform constitutional design. We also suspect that caseload or financial pressures may
limit a court’s ability to conduct in-depth historical research and therefore affect its use
of history as an interpretive resource.
Still, while particular uses of history may depend on idiosyncratic features of the
constitutional culture, our examples indicate that history is broadly relevant even in
jurisdictions that disclaim its significance, and has limited reach even in jurisdictions
that herald its importance. The variations in the uses of constitutional history across
comparative systems stem from the particularities of the political, historical, and
cultural context in which those practices are located.
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